2l6 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
The interest in national identities also inhabits a current scholarly yearning for globalisation. Modern concerns with internationalism and inter-culturalism have turned the spodight on die national identities which seem to stand in their way. For Europeans, the complex layering of region, nation and supra-nationalism and the inter-relationship of die multiple ethnicities which diey represent have become important in the cultural, economic and political formation of the European Union. So have been concerns with the post-imperial and often synthetic nationalisms of Asia and Africa, now sometimes construed as the means for the continued dominance of specific elites, as the source of major edinic stress and as barriers to material and cultural development.
These problems of multi-ethnic societies within specifically nineteendi-century state configurations have been just as apparent in Europe. In the British case, die renewed propaganda for a patriotic history stimulated by die Thatcher government, with its promotion of a national educational system and curriculum, produced an almost inevitable reaction among scholars. That was certainly die case with die History Workshop group's fascination with patriotism and national identity.
3 Post-colonialism and other multi-disciplinary scholarly alliances have continued to develop concerns with cultural values, mydis, constructions of die past and inventions of traditions. The emergence of a new environmental history has also played a key role. Here, a significant shift has taken place from a supposedly realist and scientific approach to a largely constructivist one. Nature, landscape, and perceptions of environmental change have diemselves been increasingly recognised as cultural constructs which play dieir own part in notions of identity. 4 Perhaps all tiiis helps to explain why the chronological landscape has been so complex, stimulating die four questions posed at the beginning of die paper. First, which century is die key? English and Welsh, and in a more negative form Irish, identities have inevitably looked to the Tudor period for die origins of Britishness. This was die period when die word 'empire' was first used to mean die enlarging state, a time when Welsh figures were influential at the royal court, when bodi history and die dieatre were bent towards propagandist underpinnings of diat state, when settlements were begun across die Irish Sea and tentative steps taken towards more distant colonisation. For Scots, die 1603 Union of die Crowns inevitably marks a significant turning-point, leading to a period of intense theorisation about two nations widi a single monarch, with visible representations of such intellectualisation expressed in the court masque, architecture and public pageants, particularly those associated with the visits of the monarch. 5 But the 1707 Union of Parliaments seemed even more significant; for Sir John Seeley it marked virtually the start of Scottish history because it represented both the beginnings of material progress for the Scots (and therefore of the cultural and intellectual achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment) and the true origins of the creation of nineteenth-century Greater Britain. 6 If modern historians have departed from the first proposition, stressing significant economic and intellectual foundations in the seventeenth century, they have perhaps continued to accept the second. And if imperialism brought this Greater Britain to apparent fruition in the nineteenth century, it also helped to form the myth of British national character. This concept of national character relates to the alleged characteristics of individuals rather than the more all-embracing totality of national identity. We can now recognise, however, that national character as formulated in the nineteenth century was a myth that was essentially English and masculine, represented as phlegmatic, unemotional, unintellectual, individualist, eccentric, sporting (both literally and metaphorically), fair-minded and essentially youthful.
7 It was a national character which was often promoted by those who were not English (John Buchan would be a good example), but which was also frequently contrasted with the characteristics both of the English of the eighteenth century and before, and of the other ethnic groups of the British Isles.
If there seems, then, to be a problem of origins, there is equally a difficulty in construction. Many scholars of identity and representation, including Iinda Colley, see national identities as constituted of negative elements in relation to Others. Thus, for Colley, the formation of a distinctively British identity was made up in the later eighteenth century in contradistinction to France: Protestantism contrasted with Catholicism, constitutional monarchy with absolutism, a commercial and progressive economy with an agrarian and backward one, an essentially bourgeois with an aristocratic society. 8 For Edward Said and the later post-colonialists, the Others are non-European and the manichean polarities become white and black, rational and emotional, technologically sophisticated and primitive, with subjection to the western rule of law on the one hand and the supposedly arbitrary whims of indigenous rulers on the other. 9 Here identity is formed out of notions of racial difference and a profound sense of superiority already present in the eighteenth century, but considerably developed in the nineteenth.
10 But as Anthony D. Smith has argued, self-formulated national identities in Europe and elsewhere are invariably about fractions of uniqueness as well as about alleged cultural superiority." They therefore have a much greater depth than these contemporary negative reactions: they are forged out of a reading of history upwards into the realm of myth. They search for and construct a unique complex of national ethnic origins, often expressed through linguistic identities and literary formulations of heroic migration and community cohesion, with chivalric encounters and cultural interpretations of a distinctive geography and landscape. They also often appeal to a distant past in order to establish a critique of more recent times. In any case, the binary Other has surely been emphasised too much. We need to pay more attention to the positive referent society, not only the mythic Merrie past, but also the geographically distant positive Other. It is interesting that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Japan was used in this way, both by British propagandists anxious about the lack of a true social and political coherence, and therefore of national efficiency, in the United Kingdom, and by the re-emerging nationalities of the Celtic periphery. The Meiji political and intellectual myth-making about her own distant past, and her communication of such historical myths to the populace, was indeed keenly followed.
12
While such readings of mythic origins begin in the late fifteendi century, it was in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries that they became powerfully instrumental. And the uniqueness that they celebrated was not British, but English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish. They often interwove both aristocratic and folk traditions, as in James Edward Williams between the 1690s and 1790s. 13 According to Jeanne Sheehy, Irish cultural traditions were being formed at a slightly later date.
14 All these 'Celtic' myths quite specifically contrasted their cultural character with that of the English, in their devotion, for example, to epic poetry and music, with various forms of the harp interestingly turning up in each. How then do these sub-nationalities relate to the imperial identity of Greater Britain? Do they cohere with it or run counter to it? Seeley, of course, had nothing to say about such British ethnicities except to draw some very curious comparisons. He likened Maori resistance in New Zealand to that of Highland Scottish clans, by which he presumably meant the Jacobite revolts of the eighteenth century. He also considered the presence of French in Canada, Maoris in New Zealand and Dutch and Africans in South Africa as being no different from the peoples of Wales, Scotland and Ireland, who had distinctive Celtic blood and similarly spoke, as he engagingly put it, unintelligible languages.'
5 Despite its cultural arrogance, this is a curiously non-racial formulation. Moreover, it seems to recognise the essentially romantic character of ethnic identities. And it reflects the coherence between the construction of such identities and Seeley's view of history. His vision was akin to the literary adventure tradition distinguished by the American scholar, Martin Green: lively, dramatic, broad events upon a large canvas, easily captured in story and communicated to the young.' 6 Here, imperial history and romantic nationalism meet on a common cultural ground. They also bring together the essentially bourgeois and intellectual character of the construction of both ethnic identities and the ideologies of imperial idealism. 20 We should not be confused by the pro-Boer tendencies of Lloyd George. In that respect he was a maverick and, by the time of die First World War, he could marshal imperial rhetoric widi the best of them. Even die Irish negotiated dieir cultural nationalism in relation to Empire, as in the plays of Dion Boucicault or die prominence of both Protestant and Cadiolic Irish (admittedly often at different levels of die hierarchy) in die military and police forces of die colonial territories.
'
But diere was one great difference between die Welsh and die Irish and die Scots and mat was in die levels of emigration. Welsh emigration declined in die course of the nineteendi century and by die 1890s Wales, uniquely, experienced net immigration. Hence, while Welsh names abound in die West Indies from an earlier period, and while die exploits of Welsh regiments and individual missionaries were celebrated in die Empire, die fame of the relatively small Welsh settlements in Pennsylvania or Patagonia indicates die extent to which diere was nodiing like die interactive experience of homeland and colonial settlement of die Irish or particularly die Scots.
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In die Scottish case, anodier great paradox is die relationship of Scottish participation in Empire tojacobitism. In die eighteendi century, Scottish commercial involvement in empire was specifically anti-Jacobite. The Scottish burghs resoundingly turned their backs onjacobitism, often at some temporary cost to themselves. 23 The involvement of Scots personnel in Empire and die formation of London factions connected witii such imperial patronage also distanced diemselves from romantic Stuart treason. The sons of Highland aristocrats migrated to die Empire to try to reverse die attainders of die post-1745 'pacification', and Highland regiments were formed as evidence of loyalty to die victorious Hanoverian imperial dispensation. 24 Yet, by die later nineteendi century, as Murray Pittock has argued in relation to domestic Scodand, it was to be partly the romantic signs and symbols of a re-invented Highland culture which were to become die key elements of die interaction of home and Empire in die reconciliation of Scottish edinic nationalism widi its global stage.
25 I say partly, because this imperial interaction was also bound up widi die securely Lowland Burns traditions and die effort to construct Scottish heroes, such as David Livingstone, as combining in dieir persons bodi Highland and Lowland characteristics. 26 We need to remember diat Scots linguistic distinctions embraced Scots as well as Gaelic. Such a cunningly contrived amalgam of Highland and Lowland elements, neady represented in die Burns societies and Highland games, Caledonian and St Andrews organisations diat sprang up around the Empire, in colonies of setdement, India and dependent territories, helped to satisfy what was already clearly perceived as die basic geographic, etiinic and cultural problem in a Scottish nationalist identity. And by die mid to late nineteendi century, die Scots had a very considerable stage upon which it could be worked out.
The eighteenth-century Scottish grasp of imperial opportunities is startling. The city of Glasgow, soon to arrogate to itself a claim as 'Second City of die Empire', expanded mightily and rebuilt itself on die strengdis of its American, West Indian and later Asian trades. 27 The Scots' infiltration of the East India Company's marine and medical establishments was notorious.
28 So was their presence at every level of die Company's activities, as soldiers, governors, diplomats and orientalist scholars. As is now well known, Warren Hastings gadiered a group of Scots around him, and Scots governors in soudiern India were later to institute a wholly new land revenue system based upon die peasantry. Anglo-British Identity, i68g-c.i8^o (Cambridge, 1993) 32 To all of these were added the large numbers who left Scotland in both the forcible and semi-voluntary migrations of die late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Thus the influence of Scots was to be found in almost all colonies. As I have argued in the past, akhough the administration and legal systems of empire seemed to be predominantly English, the Scots set about exporting diose aspects of their civil culture that had been preserved by die 1707 Act of Union.
33 They asserted their right to develop Presbyterian missions and education in India freed from the established Anglican hierarchy. 34 They developed colleges and schools in India and elsewhere in the dependent territories. Many universities in die colonies of setdement were founded on the Scottish model. The schismatic tendencies of the Church of Scodand, particularly symbolised by die Disruption of 1843, served to enhance radier dian inhibit die energy of Presbyterian missions diroughout die Empire. In India, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta acquired two Scots colleges each where previously diere had been one. The Scottish Episcopal Church was just as influential as its Church of England sister in establishing churches of die Anglican Communion widiin die Empire. While die Scottish universities passed through a difficult period in the middle decades of (1982) Such pride in imperial achievement, coupled with a sense of duty towards the colonial enterprise, was to be powerfully reflected in the religious, social, intellectual and economic life of Scotland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A great deal of work remains to be done on the role of the churches in the dissemination of notions of identity in relation to empire, but there can be little doubt that the missionary societies and missionaries on furlough had a hand in stressing the imperial field as a means to the expression of a distinctively Scots Presbyterian duty. The hero-worship of David Livingstone and die countless biographies written in his memory indicate mis strongly.
'
Further evidence comes from die number of missionary memoirs which pointed to Livingstone as the classic Scots exemplar which tfieir authors wished to follow. We now know of the existence of many societies which particularly involved women in die imperial enterprise. These included die Greenock Ladies' Overseas Missionary Association, which raised money for Christina Forsydi's mission school in Fingoland on die eastern Cape, die Glasgow Ladies' Colonial Association and die Glasgow Ladies' Association for the Advancement of Female Education in India. 42 If these represent die strongly imperial orientation of Glasgow and die Clyde region, it should not be a surprise diat Mary Slessor, so often depicted as one of die principal heroines of missionary endeavour in Africa, came from die notably imperial city of Dundee, its economy tighdy connected widi die jute of Bengal, shipping and whaling.
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The 1880s, the decade in which the Partition of Africa was pushed forward with particular vigour, are key years in die coming to fruition of tiiese imperial identities. The Boy's Brigade, founded by William Alexander Smidi in Glasgow in 1883 and destined to expand diroughout Britain and the Empire, as well as to spawn many imitations among other denominations and religions, had a distincdy imperial tone and inevitably venerated die Scots imperial heroes. 44 The Royal Scottish Geographical Society, founded in die four centres of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen in 1884-5, initially emphasised die intellectual and economic relationships between Scodand and Africa and later promoted wider imperial connections, including Scodand's own expedition to Antarctica. 45 Many of its early speakers suggested that Scots had a particular genius for exploration and colonisation.
This seemed to be reflected in the presence of so many industrial, shipping and commercial figures who represented the self-help ideals of Samuel Smiles, born in Haddington, East Lodiian. Smiles was himself heavily influenced by the imperial experience and shifted in his own lifetime from a tradition of domestic radical auto-didacticism to one of personal achievements through Empire. 46 The Indian Mutiny had a profound effect on Smiles and he set about emphasising British heroism in the face of the Revolt, including mat of the Scottish hero, Sir Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde. Soon, David Livingstone became Smiles's principal self-help hero, and after the drama of his death and the return of his body in 1873, an engraving of the famous Annan photograph of the missionary was used as the frontispiece for all subsequent editions. In Glasgow and the West of Scodand, figures such as Livingstone's fellow student and friend James 'Paraffin' Young, Sir William Mackinnon, Lord Overtoun, and Sir Donald Carrie became involved both in Scottish enterprise and missionary endeavour (particularly mat of the Free Church in Nyasaland, Malawi). 47 The personnel of companies such as die African Lakes, founded by die Moir brodiers of Edinburgh to advance Livingstone's ideals, and die Imperial British East Africa, die belatedly chartered brainchild of Mackinnon, stressed dieir Scottish character, as did die wealthy magnates of die Far Eastern hong of Jardine Madiieson. 48 It has sometimes been objected diat the Scottish relationship widi Empire reflects different and disconnected regions of die country. The East India Company connections were primarily widi the North East. So was much early missionary endeavour. The Western Highlands contributed more dian dieir fair share of migration dirough die Clearances. Much of the imperial activities of die later nineteendi century were connected widi die central belt and in particular widi Glasgow and die Clyde. Scots diemselves diought regionally radier dian nationally. This may have been true in die eighteendi century, a time when die Scots were more powerfully under attack for tiieir opportunistic seizure of imperial enterprise and were dierefore eager to seek acceptability dirough British patriotism. But diere can be little doubt mat an overall conception of Scodand had been created by die 45 John M. MacKenzie, "The Provincial Geographical Societies in Britain, 1884-1914' in Geography and Imperialism, ed. Bell et al., pp. 93-124. 46 Angus Calder, 'Samuel Smiles: the Unexpurgated Version', The Raven Anarchist Quarterly, v (1992), pp. 79-89. 47 John McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 18J5-1940 (Cambridge, 1977 later nineteenth century. Although regiments supposedly had local or clan connections, they often recruited most successfully among the urban population of the central belt. The resulting iconographic status of the Scottish soldier thus contributed to a sense of an integrated Scottish culture, even if marked out by supposedly distinctive Highland forms of dress. Popular imperial art, in paintings and in engravings in the illustrated press and popular books of heroes and school texts, celebrated the Scottish soldier, easily recognised in his kilt or trews, throughout the century and particular regiments became inseparably associated widi such imperial events as the Relief of Lucknow or the Battle of Omdurman. Such associations were equally potent in the Highlands, as so many monuments testify. These would include the striking memorial to the Lovat Scouts in the Boer War in Beauly or the massive tower commemorating 'Fighting Mac', Sir Hector MacDonald, at Dingwall (despite the rather dubious circumstances of MacDonald's death), both erected in Edwardian times. Improvements in communications and the development of the mass market, with the cultural and imperial strategies of its advertising and the projection of distinctive commodities would also have contributed to this.
It might also be objected that regional distinctions would have been matched by differences in class responses. Mary Slessor and David Livingstone were resolutely working-class imperial heroes who were certainly manipulated by middle-class writers. But there can be little doubt that figures such as these, together with the churches, schools and youth organisations which promoted them, had an influence upon working-class identity. They were celebrated as much as such by the auto-didacts of the trade union movement, die working men's clubs and left-leaning politicians. There is also solid evidence that the working class responded to commercial heroes who inhabited die sentimental fantasy land of rags to riches. The classic case would be Thomas Lipton, whose connections with Ireland and the Empire (notably the Ceylon of his extensive tea plantations) were promoted through his shops, advertisements and packagings. 49 Odier Scottish-produced commodities, like Camp Coffee, brought together imperial and military iconography in a potent mix.
This negotiation of Scottish identity in relation to Empire was particularly notable in die Scottish imperial exhibitions which took place in both Glasgow and Edinburgh. These consciously vied with dieir English equivalents and set out to create imaginative geographies in which Scotland was placed at die centre of die empire of trade, heavy industries, setdement and culture. The Glasgow Exhibition of 1888, which was conceived as a direct competitor of the Manchester Jubilee exhibition of 1887, not only stressed Glasgow and Scotland's role in shipping, technology, heavy industrial manufactures and iron work, but also invoked a Scottish past with a realistic mock-up of the medieval Archbishop's Palace of Glasgow, demolished more than a hundred years earlier.
50 Scottish archaeological and antiquarian concerns were also emphasised, as was a distinctive cultural identity through matching colossal statues of Burns and Scott.
Inevitably, the exhibition also promoted Scotland as a destination for tourism, as a romantic and sublime landscape worthy of being visited in association with the exhibition, particularly by returning imperial migrants. Clyde steamers and Glasgow's Clydeside resorts did well out of this stress upon Scottish scenic and historical heritage. In a conscious aping of South Kensington, the profits of the exhibition were to fund a School of Art and a Museum and Art Gallery. The painting by Sir John Lavery of Queen Victoria opening the exhibition deserves an imperial deconstruction all its own. This didactic and idealistic spirit also ran through the 1901 Glasgow exhibition and the 1907 equivalent in Edinburgh. It reached a considerable climax in 1911 when the Glasgow exhibition was specifically designed to promote the Scottish cultural renaissance which had already been manifested throughout the Empire in the founding of Caledonian societies, the holding of Highland games, and the erection of statues of Burns.
This Scottish Exhibition of National History, Art and Industry laid considerable emphasis on the Scottish past, on distinguished Scotsmen and on Scotland's contribution to the world, and its profits were to fund a chair of Scottish history and literature at Glasgow University. Lord Kelvin's role in the laying of Atlantic and other imperial cables, David Livingstone's appropriation of East and Central Africa for Scotland and the contribution of Scots to Canada were all prominently featured. The reconstructions of the Auld Toun and the Highland Clachan set out to reconcile Lowland and Gaelic culture, while suggesting their joint role in the creation of the Scottish spirit that had produced modern technology and industry. Historical pageants featured the traditional heroes of the Scottish past. It is perhaps not surprising that the exhibition attracted pilgrimages of Scottish Americans and parties of New Zealanders as well as Scots from other colonies. '"Perilla Kinchin and Juliet Kinchin, Glasgow's Great Exhibitions (Bicester, 1988) Finlay, however, argues that these imperial cultural and political relations waned considerably after the First World War, a view which connects with a long-standing interpretation in British history as a whole. 53 The evidence does not, however, seem to support this. All the characteristics of an imperial culture seem, on the contrary, to continue in a relatively unbroken line until after the Second World War. 54 Despite the economic disasters of the inter-war years, for example, Glasgow continued to stress her imperial status and emphasised the municipal socialism that was closely related to it. 55 The cinema and juvenile literature continued in the modes carved out in the later nineteenth century and Scottish nationalism was at its most imperial at this time. 56 The Scottish Empire Exhibition of 1938 was an even grander affair than its predecessors, specifically designed as a means of lifting western Scotland out of the depression by emphasising the potential of imperial preference as laid out in the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. 57 Once again, 5 a distinctive Scottish culture was delineated in the Highland clachan and in the pageants held at Ibrox Stadium. Given the character of the displays in the various pavilions, no visitor could have been in any doubt as to the imperial economic system which was being projected through the exhibition. Although the Glasgow working class-and indeed otiier classes-would have exhibited a great range of identities, including Protestant, Catholic, Highland, Lowland, Irish, as well as class and professional affiliations linking them to national and international connections through unions, churches or societies, none would have been in any doubt that this was an imperial city whose workforce was highly dependent upon the export opportunities of empire. This was strongly projected through both the working-and middle-class press of the city, even dirough its architecture, street furniture, public parks and statuary. 58 The common enterprise of Empire, sanctified by Church, school and a broad spectrum of political opinion, surely helped to overlay these social fractures and sometimes competing interests. Shipbuilding and all its related heavy industries was inseparably connected to imperial companies, and noticeably so. 59 The notion that the Clyde was a highway of Empire was much hyped and the highly visible coming and going of ships from and to imperial destinations served to emphasise this. Many of the manufactures of the city were closely connected to the imperial market, and the companies involved in such trades never failed to emphasise such relationships, almost as a patriotic imperative, however short-sighted it may have been in economic terms. By 1953, the various companies that made up the North British Railway Company (amalgamated in 1903), had sent well over half of its total production to imperial territories. 60 It even exhibited a locomotive intended for the by then independent India at the 'Colonial Week' of 1950.
In an earlier article, I argued that Scotland has long required a European or global connection to set over against the dominance of its English neighbour.
6 ' Until the eighteenth century, this relationship was satisfied both by the Auld Alliance with France and by the trading relationships of Scotland with the Baltic and the Low Countries.
62 From the eighteenth until the mid-twentieth centuries, it was supremely 58 justified by Empire, where the Scots were able to establish a distinctive identity which reflected back upon the survival of her religious, intellectual, legal and ediical civil culture. Today it remains reflected in the currently dominant nationalist cry of Scotland and Europe. Thus, when the Scottish experience is put together widi that of Wales, Irelandboth the Republic and Ulster in their very different ways-and, it must be said, die English regions, we arrive at the greatest paradox of all. The British Empire, supposedly central to the forging of the national identity of Britons in opposition to the French, may well have performed a very different function. Instead of creating an overall national identity, it enabled the sub-nationalisms of the United Kingdom to survive and flourish. Each was able to create a loop beyond the English, a loop whereby ethnic mydis could be reciprocally nurtured and developed. Perhaps the Empire was more notable in preserving a plurality of British identities than in welding together a common imperial tradition. That may well be die principal lesson of die end of Empire and the discovery of distinctive regionalisms within Europe.
Imperialism is all too glibly depicted as a culturally repressive force. From opposite ends of die political spectrum and with very different intentions, bodi Tom Nairn and one of the last of die imperial historians, Sir Reginald Coupland, have argued diat this was die case. For Nairn, die end of Empire was a necessary precondition for die break-up of Britain. 63 Coupland was expressing similar anxieties in his last book, Welsh and Scottish Nationalism, published posthumously in 1954. 64 He had been involved in discussions regarding the status of die Irish Free State and in die constitutional debates leading to Indian independence, and these experiences led him to suggest diat decolonisation would test die bonds of die metropolitan state. 65 As an apologist for Empire, it was inevitable diat he would be convinced of die beneficence of Union to die development of die British state. It represented 'a great political and psychological achievement', creating an Imperial patriotism both superseding local nationalism and confirming die Hanoverian line.
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The Celtic fringe had to be absorbed by the Anglo-Saxon heartland to create a complementary economic system, enhance the population available for die imperial enterprise, and ensure diat the danger of foreign invasion was reduced or eliminated. Coupland's consolatory reaffirmation, almost a deadibed plea for Union and national greatness, was virtually die last gasp of imperial scholarship. 63 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (London, 1977) . 64 Sir Reginald Coupland, Welsh and Scottish Nationalism (London, 1954 Ashton and S. E. Stockwell (London, 1996) , Part I, pp. 281-6. 66 C o u p l a n d , Welsh and Scottish Nationalism, p p . xv, 12, 113.
It is true that the imperial state did attempt the suppression of regional ethnicities, particularly through educational and linguistic policies, 67 but diese were notably unsuccessful. Indeed, it may be argued that, as such policies invariably do, they stimulated a powerful defensive reaction and fed into the major cultural and language revivals that took place in Wales and Scotland from the later nineteenth century. In the Scottish case, that revival had important imperial dimensions: not only were societies founded throughout the Empire, but there was a realisation that Scottish linguistic and musical traditions has survived among migrant populations eager to maintain their cultural identities in colonies of settlement, notably in Canada and New Zealand. 68 Imperialism was repressive in many ways, but throughout the British Empire, it had a tendency to perpetuate and enhance regional and ethnic identities among indigenous peoples, whether through indirect rule policies or divide and rule tactics. Clearly, the social, cultural and political objectives of the ruling Establishment were very different at home, but maybe the unintended results were not so distinct. It surely does a disservice to its metropolitan participants to imagine that imperialism always tended towards the suppression of regional and ethnic identity. The end of Empire is too easily seen as the precondition for the rekindling of the suppressed nationalisms of the so-called regions of the British Isles, heading them towards their referenda. In fact, Empire, in establishing those world-wide connections and global loops, had just as much an effect upon the preservation and strengthening of the distinctive identities of the Scots and the other edinicities of Greater Britain. Diasporas have their origins in considerable distress, but ultimately they invariably strengthen the ethnic and nationalist causes from which they stem. Empire was as capable of producing an enlarged consciousness as a false consciousness.
